Is ‘Star Wars’ Back? How America, China and India Prepare For Space Warfare
The idea of orbital warfare is moving from science fiction towards military hardware. As Washington advances space-based capabilities, Beijing and New Delhi are developing technologies that could support counterspace operations.
Troy Meink, America’s Air Force Secretary, told a conference in Maryland last week that the US now has “on-orbit space control weapons” capable of defending joint forces against hostile action. A day later, General Douglas Schiess, the new chief of Space Operations, said Guardians already operate such systems.
Neither official identified the hardware, its orbit or the date of its first flight. However, the admission marked a significant development in the military use of space.
What Weapons Is America Putting Into Space?
The Golden Dome programme is turning orbital warfare from a science-fiction concept into military hardware. US President Donald Trump ordered the programme in the first days of his second term.
The system includes planned space-based interceptors designed to destroy hypersonic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles during boost or mid-course flight. A constellation of target-indication satellites is also being developed, with its first satellites due to launch this month.
In the US, therefore, flight-ready interceptor technology forms part of a developing offensive space capability. The programme has moved from contracts to hardware development in less than a year, with an initial capability targeted for 2028.
Meanwhile, the public language of “space control” covers both offensive and defensive systems. Non-kinetic tools can include radio-frequency jammers and spoofers, laser systems designed to saturate optical sensors, and cyber payloads capable of targeting command networks.
These systems could disrupt reconnaissance and navigation during a crisis. If space-based interceptors perform as intended, they could also reduce the number of missiles reaching their targets before warheads separate.
How Far Has China Gone In Preparing For Orbital Combat?
China has spent more than a decade developing technologies with potential military applications, including robotic arms, satellite rendezvous and orbital refuelling.
Shijian-17 carried a robotic arm into geosynchronous orbit in 2016 before moving far from its apparent communications role. Then, in January 2022, Shijian-21 rendezvoused with a defunct Beidou navigation satellite, grappled with it and towed it thousands of kilometres into a graveyard orbit.
That operation demonstrated the ability to capture and relocate a large, non-cooperative object in a strategically important orbit. Although debris removal has civilian applications, the same technology could potentially move a satellite without destroying it.
In 2025, Shijian-21 and Shijian-25 spent months docking and undocking during an orbital refuelling trial. Because fuel enables spacecraft to remain operational, refuelling could also support vehicles capable of extended missions.
China has also developed formation-flying capabilities, with groups of Shiyan and Shijian satellites moving through coordinated patterns in low Earth orbit.
Patents and procurement documents from Chinese military-linked universities describe pursuit satellites and nets. Direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles have been tested since 2007, while the DN series has continued that development.
Directed-energy and electronic-warfare facilities on the ground add further capabilities. A reusable Chinese spaceplane also provides a platform capable of remaining in orbit and releasing secondary objects.
China has officially accused the United States of starting a new arms race. However, its own space programme continues to develop technologies with potential military applications.
Where Does India Fit Into The New Space Race?
India already possesses several technologies that could support a counterspace capability.
New Delhi has been a space-faring nation since the 1960s and tested a kinetic anti-satellite interceptor during Mission Shakti in 2019. Its Defence Ministry has also issued a joint military space doctrine that treats orbit as a war-fighting domain.
The Defence Space Agency provides an organisational foundation for such capabilities.
After a Chinese spacecraft approached within a kilometre of an Indian satellite in 2024, and following the use of Chinese-supplied tracking against Indian forces during fighting the following year, India accelerated its space-based surveillance plans.
The programme includes 52 satellites, with 31 planned to be built by private companies. The satellites have a budget of nearly Rs 27,000 crore and are being developed towards a 2029 target.
Persistent optical and radar coverage of India’s borders and the Indian Ocean is the stated purpose. The programme also provides greater redundancy if individual large platforms are attacked.
India is additionally developing technologies for space interdiction. One design involves a robotic arm capable of attaching to a spacecraft considered hostile and moving it. Another involves a small formation intended to surround an intruding spacecraft and steer it away.
The underlying technology has already been demonstrated through ISRO’s SpaDeX docking trials in 2024-25, which achieved controlled contact at orbital speed.
Digantara’s SCOT satellite, launched in 2025, can track objects only a few centimetres in size orbiting Earth. A satellite for detecting missile launches is planned for 2027.
Mission DefSpace has also presented 75 technical challenges to private companies, including autonomous orbital inspection.
These technologies have dual-use potential. A docking system designed to service a friendly satellite could potentially be used against an unfriendly spacecraft. Similarly, a satellite designed to escort another vehicle could potentially be used for interception.
Whether India already possesses weapons in space depends on the definition. However, it already has sensors, rendezvous software and an industrial base that could support a counterspace capability.
Can The Outer Space Treaty Survive Orbital Weaponisation?
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in orbit. However, conventional and directed-energy weapons remain within a broader legal grey area.
Meanwhile, US intelligence has for two years pointed to a Russian programme involving a nuclear anti-satellite device in space. Moscow denies the allegation.
A high-altitude nuclear explosion would not necessarily need to strike a satellite directly. The 1962 Starfish Prime test demonstrated how an electromagnetic pulse and radiation belts produced by a nuclear explosion could disable spacecraft across a wide area.
An orbital nuclear weapon could remain on station, reduce warning times and increase pressure to act quickly during a crisis.
Public documents for the Golden Dome programme describe any placement of nuclear weapons in space as a threat. Detection systems capable of identifying fissile material against trapped radiation are being studied because the treaty itself cannot enforce compliance.
Once conventional orbital weapons become established, the incentive to develop systems capable of affecting an entire orbital belt in a single strike could also increase.
The consequences could extend beyond individual countries. Low Earth orbit is already crowded, and a kinetic conflict could generate debris that crosses national boundaries and remains in orbit for decades.
Is Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Strategy Returning?
Washington may see technological competition in space as a way to impose costs on China. However, China differs significantly from the Soviet Union that faced Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
Reagan’s “Star Wars” programme envisioned a space-based system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. It became part of a wider technological competition with the Soviet Union and highlighted the costs associated with matching US technological ambitions.
The lesson was that technological competition could place significant financial pressure on a rival.
America’s current push towards space-based weapons may similarly reflect an effort to use technological advantages to encourage China to spend heavily on defensive capabilities.
However, China has a larger economy, significant industrial depth and expanding technological capabilities. Those factors give Beijing the capacity to develop its own response.
If Washington believes that space supremacy can impose a one-sided burden, Beijing may demonstrate that two can play the game. India may also develop capabilities of its own.
