- Xi’s BRICS visit in New Delhi tests whether the China–India thaw can yield substantive bilateral rapprochement.
- New Delhi approved one small mainland China FDI and stalled Alipay+ linkage to UPI, exposing persistent mistrust.
- India’s de-risking, voiced by S. Jaishankar, risks tying its hands and weakening BRICS as a Global South cooperation model.
China has confirmed that President Xi Jinping will attend the BRICS Leaders’ Summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, ending weeks of speculation over his participation. Chinese analysts are now watching whether Xi’s first visit to India in seven years can further unblock relations between Asia’s two largest powers.
In an analysis for Mekong News Network, a Yunnan-based Chinese outlet focused on Southeast Asia, Zhang Shujian, an associate research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies under the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that despite improving diplomatic ties, continued restrictions on Chinese investment and financial services have exposed persistent mistrust between Beijing and New Delhi.
Relations plunged to a historic low after a deadly clash along the disputed Himalayan border in 2020, which led to a four-year military standoff. The two sides reached a disengagement agreement in 2024 and have since resumed direct flights, eased some visa and procurement restrictions and restarted border talks. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China last year for the first time in seven years.
A Thaw With Limits
Despite this progress, Zhang said “pain points remain stubbornly lodged” in the relationship.
Reports of India “unshackling” economic ties with China have appeared frequently, but official data showed that New Delhi approved only one foreign direct investment proposal from mainland China during the 2025-2026 financial year. The proposal was worth just 10 million rupees, or about $105,000.
This suggests a gap between policy changes and their administrative implementation, Zhang said. India eased some restrictions on Chinese investment this year, particularly in electronics, capital goods and solar-cell manufacturing, but projects connected to Chinese companies remain subject to extensive security scrutiny.
Zhang also pointed to India’s handling of a proposal from Alipay+. The Singapore-based platform, operated by Ant International, proposed in January that it connect with India’s Unified Payments Interface to make cross-border payments easier for Indian travelers. Indian authorities stalled the proposal, citing data-security and fraud concerns.
“In the eyes of Indian decision-makers, cooperation with China has largely become a tactical arrangement serving the rise of Indian manufacturing,” Zhang wrote. “The idea is to first use Chinese capital and technology to build up India’s strength, then seek strategic checks on China. That mentality remains far removed from the principle of mutual benefit.”
India’s De-Risking Strategy
Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently placed “de-risking,” diversification and greater economic resilience at the center of India’s response to intensifying global competition. Referring specifically to Beijing, he said: “We have to do business with the entire world. That includes China too. But it is important we deal with them confidently.”
Zhang described that position as consistent with Jaishankar’s realism and emphasis on strategic confidence. However, he warned that “if confidence manifests only as unilateral scrutiny and restrictions, rather than healthy competition and cooperation under reciprocal rules, India risks tying its own hands.”
Strategic Autonomy Returns
Zhang attributed India’s caution partly to domestic political elites that, in his view, have instrumentalized the border dispute and recast the history of bilateral relations as a story of Indian losses.
New Delhi once hoped that a harder line toward Beijing would raise its value in a China-balancing coalition, he argued, but pressure from the Trump administration on trade and tariffs has prompted Indian strategists to reconsider the importance of strategic autonomy.
“Long-term strategic misjudgments have caused a serious information blockage in India’s understanding of China,” Zhang wrote, slowing the recovery of bilateral exchanges and especially people-to-people ties.
As two major members of the Global South, China and India shape expectations for wider developing-country cooperation. BRICS therefore offers more than a venue for another Xi-Modi meeting.
“If the host country embraces the multilateral diplomatic stage but continues to approach practical bilateral cooperation with case-by-case caution or even wariness,” Zhang wrote, “it will weaken BRICS’ value as a model for cooperation and run counter to the grouping’s principles of openness and inclusiveness.”
