Executive Summary:
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New additions to the Politburo Standing Committee, Central Committee, and Central Military Commission at the 21st Party Congress in 2027 are expected to follow General Secretary Xi Jinping’s agenda, and decisions for promotions will follow cadres’ proven ability to do so rather than any novel ideas they may hold.
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Although Xi will almost certainly stay in power, the Politburo Standing Committee will likely observe the “seven up, eight down” norm, under which members to retire at 68. This would mean a complete overhaul, with the exception of First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang.
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No cadres have been promoted directly into the Politburo Standing Committee from the Central Committee since Xi himself, so any new members are likely already members of the Politburo. Prospective candidates include Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining, vice premiers Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min’er, and Head of the CCP Propaganda Department Li Shulei.
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Promotions to the roughly 200-member Central Committee might also provide glimpses of a post-Xi CCP, as members of the so-called “seventh generation” of Party leaders (i.e. those born in the 1970s) begin to accede to this key Party body.
Chinese politics has lapsed into the dull continuum of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s idealized “long rule and perennial stability” (长治久安) (People’s Daily, August 5, 2022). Observers of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are consequently shifting their gaze to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 21st National Congress—which is scheduled for some time in October or November 2027—for signs of change. Xi, who first rose to power in 2012, is likely to stay in power after this five-yearly congress. He may remain paramount leader at least until the subsequent congress in 2032, when he will be 79 years old (The Diplomat, February 5).
The capstone political event is also the moment when the Party ushers in a new Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee (ThinkChina, March 16; Congressional Research Service, April 27). Preparations for personnel changes are likely already underway, with Xi overseeing the whole process. It is not known at this stage who will end up populating the various high-level bodies following the congress, but it is possible to highlight names that are currently circulating and suggest individuals who have a high chance of selection.
New Standing Committee Will Toe Xi’s Line
Xi is set to dominate personnel movements at the 21st Party Congress much in the same way that he controlled the 20th Party Congress in 2022 (China Leadership Monitor, December 2025). Primary focus will be on changes to the Politburo Standing Committee. In accordance with the Party norm commonly referred to as “seven up, eight down” (七上八下), in which cadres aged 67 and below can remain in office or be promoted, but those who have reached the age of 68 must retire, all incumbents except First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) are set to retire. For example, Premier Li Qiang (李强), second-ranked after Xi on the Politburo Standing Committee, is expected to retire since he will be 68 by the time of the Congress (Storm Media, August 2). This norm has been consistently observed for Politburo Standing Committee members—though not Party leaders—since the 16th Party Congress in 2002 (Ling Li, December 15, 2022). Some commentators, however, speculate that it may not hold at the 21st Party Congress (Wenxue City, May 5). Based on personnel decisions made during the 20th Party Congress in 2022, it appears that the same norms do not apply to either the wider Politburo or the Central Military Commission. [1]
At the upcoming congress, there may be as many as five slots open on the Politburo Standing Committee. Traditionally, this would present an opportunity for Beijing to bring in unfamiliar faces, and maybe even novel governance ideas. Under Xi, however, this is unlikely. Party favorites for potential promotion include eligible members of the incumbent Politburo, which Xi licked into shape at the previous congress, such as Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining (陈吉宁), vice premiers Liu Guozhong (刘国中) and Zhang Guoqing (张国清), Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min’er (陈敏尔), and Head of the CCP Propaganda Department Li Shulei (李书磊) (Wenxue City, May 5). [2] It is unlikely—though not impossible—that anyone will be elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee from outside the current politburo. None have managed this feat in the Xi era, and the last to do so were Xi himself, alongside Li Keqiang (李克强) in 2007.
A number of the CCP’s fast-rising stars are tipped to be inducted to the Central Committee, which consists of roughly 200 members, as well as other important offices. These “seventh generation” (第七代) politicians have typically first gained ministerial or vice-ministerial status under Xi. They include Lu Dongliang (卢东亮), governor of Shanxi Province; Zhuge Yujie (诸葛宇杰), deputy Party secretary of Hubei Province; and Guo Ningning (郭宁宁), deputy Party secretary of Fujian Province. Mainland media have focused on their achievements as factory managers, scientific talents or local-level administrators (South China Morning Post, December 6, 2022; People’s Daily, May 23, 2025; RTI News, April 10). Zhuge and Guo have both long been seen as contenders for high office (Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2022; China Brief, December 16, 2022; CNA, October 16, 2023).
Another rising star, Wei Tao (韦韬), chairman of the Guangxi Autonomous Region, was promoted to full Central Committee membership at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in October 2025, along with ten others (Xinhua, October 23, 2025). As a current full Central Committee member, Wei, who was also the vice-governor of Shanxi Province from 2021–2025, has the best potential for promotion. Although none of them has been identified as a potential successor of Xi, one or two of this distinguished group could be inducted into the Politburo at the 21st Party Congress.
The political views of these individuals are less clear, though to remain in power and further gain promotion at the 21st and 22nd Party congresses, these potentates will simply have to continue implementing Xi’s agenda rather than exhibiting any entrepreneurial ability.
Uncertainty Surrounds Military Leadership
During his third term in power, Xi has overseen a dramatic purge of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer class, with at least 36 generals and lieutenant generals and 65 officers removed, missing, or potentially having fallen into disgrace (CSIS, February 24). This will pose problems at the 21st Party Congress, where roughly 20 percent of CCP central committees traditionally have comprised officers of the PLA or the Party’s paramilitary organization, the People’s Armed Police. It is unclear whether Xi will choose to continue this trend, especially given that he has reduced the Central Military Commission (CMC)—already slimmed down to seven individuals at the last two Party congresses—to just himself as chairman and Zhang Shengmin (张升民) as vice chair: the two previous vice chairs and three of the four members who began their terms in 2022 are now in jail (China Brief, January 26).
Xi’s distrust of the military following the historic purges of recent years may lead him to slow-walk promotions (China Brief, April 16). His decision in early July to promote two lieutenant generals to full generals—with Zhang Shuguang (张曙光) also promoted to Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission—suggests he is seeking to balance this caution with the necessity of filling vacant posts in order to maintain his modernization agenda (Xinhua, July 3; China Brief; The Diplomat, July 6).
Conclusion
Uncertainly still clouds the Chinese body politic. While it is almost certain that Xi will remain in power until at least 2032, his constant demands for loyalty, coupled with the persistent purges that indicate those demands remain unheeded, suggest chinks in the supreme leader’s armament.
Any “seventh generation” leaders promoted at the next party congress will have to continue to be faithful implementers of Xi’s policy agenda. Their increased power and relative youthfulness, however, could cast them as key figures in a potential post-Xi PRC, and thus worth keeping an eye on. For the time being, the supreme leader resorting to various means to get rid of those he perceives as his enemies is a factor that could jeopardize the stability and solid control over the polity he seeks in order to maintain the PRC’s pursuit of global preeminence. His power is therefore never absolute.
This article originally appeared in China Brief Notes. Check it out here!
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and a regular contributor to China Brief.
Notes
[1] Note that retirement norms in the Chinese Party-state are not uniform. In the Central Military Commission (CMC), for instance, vice chairmen can remain on active duty until they are 70 years old but all other senior leaders, including CMC members, service commanders, and theater command commanders must retire at age 65. There are, of course, exceptions that prove the rule (DGI, July 17, 2018; China Brief, January 17, 2025).
[2] Chen Jining is seen as part of the “Tsinghua Clique,” a group of cadres tied to Xi from his time at the university. Chen Min’er, meanwhile, is seen as part of the “Zhejiang Clique”—or “New Zhijiang Army” (之江新军)—a group of cadres who worked with Xi during his time working in the province.