Two years ago, the war in Gaza triggered a chill in diplomatic ties between China and Israel, once described by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “a marriage made in heaven”.
But Beijing and Tel Aviv appear now to have restored some balance in the relationship, driven by a shared interest in maintaining trade and technological links.
However, observers warn that the fallout from the Gaza crisis, combined with a growing rivalry between China and the US – Israel’s closest ally – could further complicate the path forward.
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Since taking office last November, China’s ambassador to Israel, Xiao Junzheng, has been actively fostering goodwill by visiting prominent joint infrastructure projects, including the Tel Aviv light rail Green Line, where Chinese construction firms have played a key role.
He has also toured a container terminal in the port city of Haifa, a move that raised security concerns in Washington.
Construction workers at a section of the Tel Aviv light rail Green Line. Photo: Xinhua alt=Construction workers at a section of the Tel Aviv light rail Green Line. Photo: Xinhua>
During meetings with senior Israeli officials and academics, Xiao stressed the importance of continuing technology and trade cooperation, which was established in 2017 under a comprehensive innovative partnership.
In May, in a departure from an ambiguous Beijing position that had disappointed Israelis, Xiao told Israeli news channel ILTV that “China opposes and condemns what Hamas did”, referring to coordinated attacks by the armed Palestinian group in October 2023.
The shift in tone from Beijing came amid a series of conflicts that have continued to roil the Middle East since the attacks, which sparked a war and a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. These include the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December, and a short war between Iran and Israel that was briefly joined by the United States.
“China’s basic strategy is to oppose Israel’s actions without being anti-Israel,” a person familiar with the matter told the South China Morning Post.
“It means voicing criticism and condemnation in diplomatic settings as a way to express China’s position, while keeping the substantive relationship intact.”
Traditionally, China has maintained good relations with Iran, Israel and Arab states in the Middle East, a resource-rich region that has served as a major hub for the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s strategy to link economies into a China-centred trading network across Asia and beyond.
But those ties were strained when Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, killing about 1,200 people and taking 251 hostages. Beijing’s reluctance to condemn Hamas at the outset drew criticism in Israel.
Israeli sentiment towards China deteriorated sharply, according to an international survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in early 2024. Among the 35 countries polled, Israel recorded the biggest drop in sentiment towards China, with only 33 per cent of Jewish Israelis viewing the country favourably, compared with 48 per cent a year earlier.
“China’s early positions, especially on Hamas and its alignment with Iran, created deep frustration in Israel and reinforced the view that Beijing is not a neutral actor,” said Gedaliah Afterman, head of the Asia policy programme at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy and Foreign Relations at Reichman University in Tel Aviv.
While Israel has drawn closer to the US, China has invested more energy to position itself in the Arab and Muslim world, hosting senior representatives of 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah, with a declaration aimed at projecting unity as the war in Gaza drags on.
“The result is a clear cooling of ties compared with the rapid growth of the previous decade,” Afterman said.
As Israel strengthened its military position in the region through its attacks against Iran, Syria and Hezbollah – a prominent Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and paramilitary group – China appeared to be recalibrating.
Speaking at a ceremony in Tel Aviv in January that marked the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Israel Changzhou Innovation Park, Xiao reaffirmed Beijing’s willingness to maintain bonds between the two countries.
“In the face of a complex and rapidly changing regional landscape, China’s resolve to uphold the friendship between our two nations remains unchanged, and its will to enhance innovative cooperation with Israel remains unchanged,” Xiao assured officials and business leaders from Israel and China.
Smoke rises from an Israeli air strike on a high-rise building in Gaza City on September 28. Photo: AP alt=Smoke rises from an Israeli air strike on a high-rise building in Gaza City on September 28. Photo: AP>
Changzhou Innovation Park – an incubator sponsored by the Chinese government – provides industrial support for Israel’s research and development. The facility is now hosting an innovation institute in collaboration with the Guangdong Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, a joint venture between Shantou University and the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. In May, the institute held a matchmaking event in Tel Aviv to link Chinese and Israeli companies in the life sciences sector.
John Calabrese, an assistant professor with American University and a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, both in Washington, said both China and Israel had a “strategic need” to stop a downward drift in their relationship.
Weary from the costs of a protracted war in the Middle East and facing a tightening circle of international criticism, Israel had “a clear incentive” to maintain its access to the vast market and investment ecosystem in China, he said.
“For China, Israeli technological expertise – already one of the most tightly monitored nodes in Washington’s push to shield critical innovation – is highly prized, despite obstacles,” Calabrese added.
“So, the result is an uneasy balancing act where leaders in both capitals appear prepared to shelve political grievances long enough to keep open channels in trade and technology.”
Still, political differences and Israel’s alliance with the US continue to figure prominently in shaping its ties with China, according to observers.
Yan Wei, deputy director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at China’s Northwest University, said Israel’s stiffening position against Palestinian statehood would continue to play a critical role in its relations with China.
“The major change in bilateral relations is that Israel has unilaterally hardened its policy on Gaza, and what it has done is in effect nearly burying the two-state solution that China has long insisted on, creating a structural problem in the relationship between China and Israel.”
If the Netanyahu government doubled down on its hardline stand in Gaza, “bilateral relations would go further downward”, Yan warned.
Fan Hongda, director of the China-Middle East Centre at Shaoxing University, said that relations between China and Israel were vulnerable to third-party factors, such as the US as well as the Palestinian cause.
“Bilaterally, technology and trade cooperation will be on the agenda of China-Israel relations. However, third-party factors, like the Palestinian cause and US influence, have posed the greatest challenge, especially in a fracturing world,” Fan said.
“These external actors represent the most substantial challenge facing China-Israel relations.”
Even before the October 7 attack, Israel’s cooperation with China had long been under scrutiny – largely from the US – due to advances by the mainly Jewish state in semiconductors and weapon technologies.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Israel suspended its sales of Phalcon airborne early detection radar systems and Harpy drones to China amid repeated threats from Washington.
Earlier, again under pressure from the US, Israel tightened its oversight on foreign investment and possible exploitation of Israeli-developed defence technologies – measures taken with China in mind.
In 2022, the administration of Joe Biden pressured Israel to limit academic and research ties with China, over fears that Beijing could access military technology through “dual-use” research efforts, sources told news portal Breaking Defence.
More recently, risks of a spillover have grown. Last month, Netanyahu accused China of supporting anti-Israel propaganda. Days later, Beijing strongly condemned an Israeli lawmaker’s visit to Taiwan, calling Knesset member Boaz Toporovsky a troublemaker and accusing him of undermining relations with Beijing after he met Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te.
As the “marriage made in heaven” adjusts to new geopolitical realities, Afterman said the two sides might instead choose to cooperate in “less sensitive sectors: life sciences, agritech, renewable energy and health research”, while trying to avoid unnecessary confrontation.
“These fields allow economic engagement without crossing Washington’s red lines, while giving Beijing a way to project continuity,” he said.
“But the relationship is fragile, and political disputes over Gaza or Taiwan can still spill over and derail progress.”
This article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the most authoritative voice reporting on China and Asia for more than a century. For more SCMP stories, please explore the SCMP app or visit the SCMP’s Facebook and Twitter pages. Copyright © 2025 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
Copyright (c) 2025. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
