A prolonged conflict between Israel and Iran would present China with a rare opportunity—even as it endangers its interests as well.
On Tuesday, June 17, Xi Jinping made his first official statement regarding Israel’s ongoing war with Iran on the sidelines of the “China-Central Asia Summit” in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Chinese leader decried the outbreak of violence, claiming that Beijing “oppose[d] any act that infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of other countries,” and stressing that escalation was “not in the common interest of the international community.”
Xi’s statement was notable not so much for its content—the language used was unremarkable—as for its timing. The statement came five days after Israel’s initial series of airstrikes on Iran, killing a series of high-ranking IRGC officers and nuclear scientists and seemingly knocking the Natanz nuclear enrichment plant out of action. China’s initial reaction to the crisis was anodyne and inoffensive, vaguely condemning the escalation in violence and urging a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Iran dispute. Many countries issue similar statements in the opening hours of a crisis, to be supplanted by more substantive ones once the country’s leadership determines what its position should be. But more than a week later—and as other countries in the region and around the world have been far more vocal in their criticisms of Israel—Beijing has seemingly remained indecisive.
The call between Xi and Russian leader Vladimir Putin to discuss the war on Thursday is also instructive in this regard. As the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout observes, Putin fiercely condemned the Israeli decision to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, claiming that the attack had been “very dangerous” and insisting on its immediate resolution. Conversely, Xi “expounded China’s principled position and said that the current situation in the Middle East is very critical, which once again confirms that the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change.” The difference in tone could hardly be more remarkable. Though Xi did also emphasize the importance of a ceasefire—and singled out Israel for starting the conflict—the Chinese leader’s remarks seem to indicate a tacit acceptance of the war.
There are good reasons China may wish to avoid taking sides between Israel and Iran. Beijing’s Middle Eastern policy as a whole is predicated on neutrality; unlike the United States, which demands certain preconditions of its partners, Beijing has made clear that it is happy to pursue commerce with anyone, no matter their geopolitical outlook or human rights record. If China were to break decisively with Israel over the strikes, it might find it difficult to do business with the Middle East’s technology hub in the future—an appalling prospect for a nation intent on modernization and scientific growth.
But China’s nonchalant position may also be borne out of a recognition that a prolonged conflict would present China with a rare opportunity—even as it endangers its interests as well.
First, the danger. Thousands of Chinese citizens live in Iran and Israel, and could be placed in harm’s way if the situation escalates further. China has advised its citizens to leave the two countries, and has begun evacuation operations. So far, no Chinese citizens are known to have been killed in strikes on either country—but if this changed, the consequences would be difficult to predict.
More broadly, an expansion of the conflict could result in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the critical chokepoint through which one-fifth of the world’s supply of energy passes on a daily basis. China disproportionately buys oil from the Gulf, and three of its five largest suppliers—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates—would be devastated by such a closure. So would Iran itself, which supplies an estimated 15 percent of China’s imports, while another major exporter, Oman, would be impacted by proximity. Though China also sources vast quantities of oil from Russia and Malaysia and could scale up these orders to make up for the shortfall, these nations would certainly raise their prices in response to increased demand, creating a headache for Beijing. Other commodity prices might increase as well, and the general global economic outlook would be negatively impacted. Such a crisis could hardly come at a worse time for China. Despite Xi’s efforts to promote a “dual circulation” economic model and decrease reliance on the United States, the Chinese economy—which has teetered on the edge of a recession since the onset of the property sector crisis in 2021—is still overwhelmingly dependent on global trade, and would suffer accordingly. Finally, if Iran were unable to deter Israel from further attacks via conventional means, it might pursue a nuclear weapon, likely leading to a wave of further nuclear proliferation across the Middle East—an outcome Beijing does not want and has worked hard to avoid.
But an enduring Middle East crisis would have one notable upside for China: from a security perspective, the consequences of a long-term war there would be far worse for the United States. Though the political bonds between Washington and Jerusalem are no longer as strong as they once were—both President Donald Trump and former President Joe Biden have voiced exasperation at Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu from the Oval Office—there has always been an understanding that the United States is Israel’s backstop of last resort. If the Jewish state were ever seriously endangered by a foreign actor, America would rush to its defense no matter the cost—as indeed President Richard Nixon did during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It would be politically unacceptable for the Trump administration not to.
This is a problem for America because its commitments are already too broad. Modern wars are fought and won with missiles; the Israel-Iran conflict is no exception, and since the onset of conflict, Israel’s air defense apparatus has burned through interceptor rockets at an unprecedented clip. Though the IDF has understandably remained tight-lipped about its consumption rate, a Washington Post report published on Tuesday suggested that Israel only had enough rockets for 10 to 12 days of fighting, after which it would rely on the United States to backfill its launchers.
Missile production is a zero-sum game, and every American missile devoted to Taiwan’s defense is a missile unable to be put to use in Israel. The reverse is also true: each American interceptor missile delivered to Israel to stave off Iran’s attack is one less missile the Taiwanese might have at their disposal. And although the precise number of missiles available to the United States is a closely held secret, there is little doubt that stockpiles are running low—particularly after more than three years of war in Ukraine, to which much of America’s ongoing production has been devoted.
China’s leaders understand America’s overcommitment problem, and have systemically worked to enlarge it. Beijing is thought to have inflamed public sentiment against Israel via social media manipulation in the post-October 7 period, stoking anti-Semitic acts of violence abroad and making a peace settlement less likely. It also provided guidance systems to the Houthis for use on their rockets targeting American ships, forcing the US Navy to expend far more valuable missiles in its own defense. Military bloggers in Beijing were elated in October when the United States moved additional THAAD systems—the only American system able to shoot down China’s fastest and most advanced missiles with any degree of reliability—to the Middle East.
So far, in keeping with its neutral attitude, China has done very little to directly aid Iran in the conflict. But there is no doubt that it is watching the American response closely, waiting to see what happens next—and considering the possibility that the crisis will grow worse. Perhaps most importantly, Trump’s will-he-won’t-he approach toward joining the Israeli war against Iran could provide a glimpse into his equally murky attitude toward Taiwan in the years to come. For the time being, Beijing has much to learn from watching the president himself.
About the Author: Trevor Filseth
Trevor Filseth is a managing editor at The National Interest.
Image: Shutterstock / 360b.
