While Donald Trump – and other western leaders – are taking their time to catch up with reality, it is obvious that Vladimir Putin has no apparent desire to halt the war in Ukraine. A realistic future military and diplomatic strategy for Kyiv has to accept that fact – and formulate a new approach.
The past six months have been dominated by the erroneous assumption that it would be possible for Trump to negotiate a ceasefire, even an armistice. That would be followed by the arrival of an Anglo-French led stabilisation force to secure the future of Ukraine. But Putin has shown no desire to stop attacking.
A fresh Russian ground offensive is emerging towards Velykyi Burluk, 50 miles east of Kharkiv, and for now is making some rare gains: three miles in 10 days. More significantly, the cynical bombing of Ukraine’s cities by missile and drone is only intensifying, straining Kyiv’s air defences and leading to more civilian casualties.
A record 728 Shahed drones and 13 missiles were launched on the night of 8 July and the next morning, many at Lutsk in the west, though the bombardment of 597 drones and 26 missiles on Friday night and Saturday morning showed no slackening of violent intent. It will be soon possible for Russia to attack with 1,000 drones in a night, Ukraine believes.
In a paper written last month, Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister, said “an acceptable armistice may never formally arrive” and that Kyiv should formulate “a revised theory of victory” – which accepts that the Kremlin considers itself engaged in a forever war against its smaller neighbour.
The former minister describes the new approach as “strategic neutralisation”, a permanent and dynamic military effort to ensure that Russia’s forces cannot advance and that Moscow becomes “operationally incapable of disrupting key aspects of Ukrainian strategic, political, economic, and social life”.
It accepts that Ukraine cannot retake territories already occupied by Moscow, or attack again into Russia, as happened into Kursk oblast last summer, and instead pursues an active defence.
As an example for what might be possible, Zagorodnyuk refers to the situation in the Black Sea. Ukraine, which began the war without a navy, had managed to box in the Russian Black Sea fleet by mid-2023 by successfully sinking and threatening to sink warships with remotely piloted sea drones.
The result is the “functional defeat” of the Russian fleet, a phrase first used by a former British junior defence minister, James Heappey. Kyiv was able to unilaterally reopen a corridor for grain shipments from Odesa and nearby areas in 2023 without having to negotiate a special exemption for such traffic with Russia.
One question is whether strategic neutralisation is possible on land. Russia has struggled to gain territory inside Ukraine during 2025, though it has collapsed the Kursk pocket, and its forces incurred casualty rates (killed and wounded) of about 1,100 a day in June – showing that Kyiv can roughly hold the line largely with the help of £300-£370 ($400-$500) first-person view (FPV) drones that it can manufacture in bulk.
But the strategy goes further. The military aim in such a plan would be to extend the depth of FPV drone operations to 25, 50 or even 100 miles – to create a zone where it is effectively impossible for Russian forces to mass – and even to walk to the frontline. Rather than create a Korean style demilitarised zone, the effect would be to create a highly militarised zone in which Russian forces could not operate, a de facto border.
The already slow rate of Russian advance suggests this approach may be possible, though an important question is what will happen once the last of the US military aid approved by former president Joe Biden tails off. It is also challenged by Russia’s expanding volume of missile and drone attacks – which in turn come at a time of growing concern about the amount of available air defence interceptors.
A series of ill-judged signals from the US reveal that the Pentagon is worried about the number of Patriot air defence missiles it has available, probably the single most important air defence system used by Ukraine. Weapons deliveries were halted at the end of last month amid fears US stockpiles were low (perhaps at 25% of the desired levels), though Trump has partially relented, sending a symbolic 10 Patriot missiles last week.
The US president, finally acknowledging that Putin is stalling, has promised a “major announcement” on Monday, which may involve extra sanctions on Russia and allowing European countries to buy more weapons for Kyiv. It would make strategic sense if whatever is offered comes with the recognition that Putin is not serious about peace – and gives Ukraine what it needs to neutralise the aggressor.
