Donald trump’s strategy in Iran is like the weather in his home state of Florida: if you don’t like it, then wait for five minutes. On Friday the president said America’s war might soon be “winding down”. Its military goals had largely been met, he said, and he seemed untroubled by Iran’s ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz since America did not “use” the waterway.
His conciliatory tone lasted only until Saturday. Then he gave Iran a 48-hour deadline to reopen the strait: if it did not comply, he warned that “America will hit and obliterate their various power plants, starting with the biggest one first.” So much for winding down.
Mr Trump’s defenders insist that his rhetorical gymnastics are part of the plan: the president is keeping his options open, and keeping Iran on its toes. To almost everyone else it is clear that America entered this war with a flawed strategy, starting with its failure to anticipate that Iran would close the strait. With the fighting entering a fourth week, Mr Trump has four options for how to proceed. He can talk, leave, continue or escalate. If he has not yet chosen one, it is because none of them are good.
A dwindling number of diplomats still think that America and Iran could negotiate a ceasefire. That seems the least likely option, however, given the hurdles to even getting the parties together. Having been attacked twice while in talks with America, Iran is understandably hesitant about another round. Its leadership is in disarray; the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not been seen since he assumed the job on March 9th. America may wonder if any Iranian interlocutor truly speaks for the regime.
Even the choice of mediator may be complicated. Oman brokered the previous two rounds, but it has angered its Gulf neighbours with its sympathetic stance towards Iran throughout the war. They would insist on an alternative mediator (Qatar seems the likeliest contender).
A narrow deal that swaps sanctions relief for limits on Iran’s nuclear programme will not suffice. America would enter any talks with maximalist demands: it also wants Iran to accept strict limits on its missile programme and end its support for Arab militias. Iran has its own wish list, which includes reparations for the war and the closure of American military bases in the region. Neither side is in the mood to make concessions.
If he cannot end the war with a deal, Mr Trump could try to simply end it. Some of his advisers are nudging the president to declare victory. He could announce, no doubt with some embellishment, that Iran’s military capabilities had been smashed: its navy sunk, its missile factories in ruins.
This would be the Trumpiest option, selling an inconclusive campaign as a decisive victory. He did it in June when he claimed that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “obliterated” by American strikes—never mind that, eight months later, he described that same nuclear programme as a threat. He might worry that voters will be harder to convince this time. Petrol prices in America are already up 34% from a month ago. But a majority of his Republican base still supports the war, and ending it now would give the oil-price shock seven months to abate before the midterms in November.
Other problems are harder to solve, though. Iran would still have roughly 400kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity—and newfound resolve to fashion it into a nuclear bomb. It would also end the war with a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz. For almost half a century, ensuring the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf has been the centrepiece of American policy in the Middle East. To end the war now would be to abandon that principle. Gulf states would be furious, and fearful of endless extortion. A few Iranian officials have already mused about charging fees from vessels transiting the strait. Israel would be unhappy as well.
A third option, then, is to stay the course. America and Israel could press ahead with several more weeks of air strikes. Many Israeli officials would prefer this option. The army chief says the campaign will continue throughout the Passover holiday, which ends on April 9th.
The number of Iranian missile-and-drone attacks on Israel and Gulf states has fallen from nearly 1,000 on the first day of the war to an average of less than 100 per day now. Some hawks in Washington argue that a few more weeks of attacks on the Iranian armed forces will drive that number lower still, or perhaps even cause the regime to collapse. Meanwhile, America would have time to send more warships to the region, and to work on building a coalition to provide escorts through the strait.
Yet there is no guarantee that any of this will work. The regime may hit a tipping point, or it may not—it is an unfalsifiable proposition. As long as Iran can keep up sporadic attacks on shipping, it can probably keep the strait closed and deny Mr Trump a victory. It can cause pain elsewhere too: more than 160 people were injured on March 21st by two ballistic missiles that hit southern Israel (attempts to intercept them failed). And it may not stop there. Faced with the prospect of a long war, it could escalate its attacks on critical infrastructure in the Gulf. Either way, economic costs would mount and ongoing Iranian attacks would deplete the supply of air-defence interceptors in Israel and the Gulf.
That points to the final option: “escalate to de-escalate”, as Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, described it on March 22nd. Mr Trump could follow through on his threat to hit Iran’s power plants. He could order marines to conduct amphibious landings to seize Kharg island, the home of Iran’s main oil-export terminal, or three islands disputed between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which occupy a strategic position near the strait. He could dispatch commandos to try to secure Iran’s enriched uranium.
Escalation would be fraught with risk. The marines who seize Iranian islands would then have to hold them, no doubt under regular drone attacks. A raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities could require commandos to secure hostile territory for days.
Gulf states would face even greater peril. Iran has already threatened to strike their power and water-desalination plants if America hits its electric grid. A raid on Kharg island might lead to bigger strikes on oil-and-gas facilities in the Gulf. The Iranian ballistic-missile attack on Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (lng) plant on March 18th caused extensive damage, enough that 3% of the world’s lng supply may be offline for up to five years, according to Qatari officials.
What is more, none of these options may actually end the war. The president could declare victory, only for Iran to keep the strait closed: it may wager that making this conflict even costlier will deter a future one. Mr Trump could press on for a few more weeks only to find himself at a similar impasse. Escalation is not an end in itself. What will America do with Kharg island if Iran refuses to negotiate a deal for it? Having started this war, Mr Trump has no easy way to finish it.
