Ni Tao is IE’s columnist, giving exclusive insight into China’s technology and engineering ecosystem. His Inside China column explores the issues that shape discussions and understanding about Chinese innovation, providing fresh perspectives not found elsewhere.
The drone warfare in the Russia-Ukraine war has reached a new level of intensity.
Russia’s first reported use of fiber-optic drones emerged on the battlefield in the summer of 2024.
These drones, tethered via fiber optic cables attached to their bottoms, are highly resistant to electronic warfare and GPS interference.
By equipping first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones with a spool of optical fiber—sometimes extending over 10 kilometers—the drones can transmit video footage to ground operators through the fiber, allowing for precise target identification and strikes.
Their built-in dual guidance system, combining radio and fiber optics, enables the drones to maintain control even when jamming radio signals.
The only potential disruption comes from physical obstacles like trees or bushes, but in actual combat, interference proves negligible. The fiber is usually too long and flexible to be severed.
The world looks to China
With this shift in drone warfare, global attention has once again turned to China. As a dominant force in the drone industry, Chinese companies control 80 percent of the world’s civilian drone market.
Over the past two years, China has been tightening export restrictions on dual-use drone components to prevent their use in conflict zones, particularly in Ukraine.
According to Bloomberg, Beijing imposed new export controls in July 2024, banning the sale of drones for military use and emphasizing that it does not supply weapons to any party in the conflict.
This followed an earlier move to restrict the flow of Chinese drone technologies abroad, ostensibly over concerns about their increasing adoption in the Russia-Ukraine war.
On August 1, 2023, China announced export controls on certain drone-specific motors, critical payloads, radio communication equipment, and civilian anti-drone systems.
Additionally, a two-year temporary export ban was imposed on some consumer-grade drones, while exporting all civilian drones for military purposes was strictly prohibited.
The most recent drone export ban has had a significant impact on Ukraine. Previously, the country relied on cheap parts from China to assemble cost-effective quadcopter kamikaze drones.
The incessant supply from China enabled Ukraine to fight a war of asymmetry against a much stronger enemy. Besides, it made Ukraine’s rapidly depleted war chest last through the economy, helping it to sustain a prolonged battle of attrition.
With China’s tightening restrictions, Ukraine has been forced to seek alternative suppliers.
Limitations of export controls
Chinese export regulations now prohibit the sale of drone payloads that meet certain technical specifications, including infrared imaging devices, synthetic aperture radar, target-designating lasers, and inertial measurement units.
For instance, infrared imaging devices with a wavelength range of 780–30,000 nanometers and an instantaneous field of view (IFOV) under 2.5 milliradians (mrad) cannot be exported without approval.
These gadgets can detect heat sources, identifying combatants with high accuracy.
Laser designators for target acquisition are also restricted if they meet certain criteria. For example, those capable of operating above 55°C, lacking temperature control, exceeding 80 millijoules (mJ) in energy output, maintaining stability within 15%, and having a beam divergence angle below 0.3 mrad may fall under the ban.
These lasers are crucial in guiding attack drones and artillery to their targets.
Regulations have curbed the flow of military-grade drone components to the battlefield. Some observers note that China is actively stepping up its drone export controls to prevent its technology from being weaponized and risking diplomatic rows with the West.
Defying the curbs
However, in practice, military innovation in drone warfare is difficult to halt through export bans or tighter regulations. Two key challenges persist. For one thing, regulation can barely keep up with the speed of innovation.
For another, there will be supply as long as there is demand. The fact that many drone components, such as fiber optics, are consumer-grade materials makes them nearly impossible to control.
Fiber optics are in high demand thanks to merits such as faster transmission speeds and clearer footage than traditional wireless networks.
They can convert light signals into electrical and digital data, allowing drones to transmit high-definition (1,080p/60fps) video in real-time with little latency.
Moreover, Russia and Ukraine, as well as other countries, can produce or acquire fiber optics. Even if China enforces stricter controls, alternative suppliers in the US or South Korea could step in.
A quick search on Taobao, one of China’s largest e-commerce platforms, returns several page results for fiber optic storage boxes for drones, available in 5km, 10km, 15km, and even 20km variants.
These cylindrical products are lightweight: 2.2kg for the 20km spool and 0.65kg for the 5km version. This means they have minimal impact on the payload capacity or range of FPV quadcopters. Their retail price? Starting at 1,960 RMB ($270) and maxing out at 4,260 RMB ($590).
AI-guided precision drones
Beyond fiber-optic FPV drones, AI-powered auto-targeting modules have also been deployed in reconnaissance and strike drones on the Ukrainian battlefield.
A Chinese startup, Littro Innovations, has developed an infrared and AI recognition tracking module for drones. After receiving video footage from a drone’s gimbal, the module detects, identifies, and tracks targets in real-time.
Its Tofu 3 module, which supports edge computing, can detect moving objects as small as 1.5 pixels. Deep learning algorithms can also recognize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) larger than 3 pixels in thermal infrared or 10 pixels in visible light.
Once a target is identified, the module enables fully automated tracking, gimbal servo control, and adaptive zoom. No manual input is required from the operator. The system offers multiple recovery solutions if a target is lost due to obstruction.
When multiple targets appear, the operator can manually select one by tapping on the screen and locking the target for tracking.
Similar AI tracking modules are readily available on Taobao, with prices ranging from 1,300 RMB to 1,500 RMB ($180-$207). When purchased in bulk, costs decrease further, allowing for large-scale drone swarm deployments.
In theory, these AI-enhanced FPV drones can rival precision-guided missiles or munitions that typically cost tens of thousands—if not hundreds of thousands—of dollars, all for just a few thousand RMB.
The prolonged war of attrition
For both Russia and Ukraine, the reliance on such low-cost weapons could indefinitely extend the war—provided they can train enough skilled FPV drone pilots and send them to the frontlines.
China’s current export restrictions have yet to include fiber optics or AI tracking modules, mainly because these are dual-use technologies, making it difficult to determine whether they will end up in combat zones.
This poses a major challenge for any further tightening of drone-related export controls.
Chinese firms making the modules and components for kamikaze drones are often smart enough to skirt the curbs by disguising them as meant for consumer-grade drones.
Meanwhile, drone technology continues to evolve. When electronic warfare and GPS jamming disrupted and disabled drones in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, new alternatives like fiber-optic drones and AI-guided tracking drones quickly emerged.
This shows how easily consistent innovations can outpace any official efforts to stem the spread of technologies.
Nanshan vs. Bao’an
China’s drone industry, particularly in its southern tech hub Shenzhen, is so vast that even if one supplier is banned today, another company will come up with an alternative and occasionally more powerful solution tomorrow.
Some observers in China jokingly refer to the Russia-Ukraine drone war not as “Kyiv vs. Moscow” but as an “internal Shenzhen war” between the city’s two major tech districts—Bao’an and Nanshan—both known for their extensive drone supply chains.
Who would have thought that nondescript items cranked out in small factories and sold on the country’s online shopping site could one day change the course of a war thousands of miles away? Yet, they already are.
Ultimately, if China truly wanted to stop drone technology from reaching Russia’s and Ukraine’s military—now shipments allegedly land more in Russian hands—it might only take decisive action if such technologies were resold to Taiwan, which Beijing sees as a renegade province.
Until then, “death from the skies” is likely to remain a brutal and tragic feature of the war.
