The sudden fall of Syrian ally Bashar al-Assad has rattled Moscow, warn Russian analysts, particularly psychologically.
The Kremlin’s 2015 military intervention in Syria was Moscow’s first such post-Soviet operation outside its own region. Its perceived success drove a lot of Russia’s subsequent diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.
Why We Wrote This
Russia was key to keeping Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in power over the last decade. Now he’s gone. But dealing with setback in the Middle East has become a familiar task for the Kremlin.
Now it has come crashing down. The Kremlin will need to absorb the likely loss of two military bases in Syria, and accept the devastating setback it means for another ally, Iran.
But this is far from the first time Moscow has faced a debacle in its Mideast relations.
Soviet-sponsored Syria lost two wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973, necessitating replacement of its military arsenal. Egypt canceled a treaty of friendship with the USSR in 1971, and kicked all Soviet advisers out of the country. Moscow’s disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s poisoned its relations with the Muslim world.
“We’ve got a long history of dealing with these countries, and we’re quite accustomed to seeing them defeated militarily,” says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. “So, the mood in Moscow [over the loss of Syria] is calm enough. It’s a bad setback, but we can get past this.”
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, which Moscow had helped to prop up for almost a decade, has dealt a serious setback to Russia’s global ambitions.
But Russian foreign policy specialists insist it’s not a ruinous one.
As they grapple with the rapid demise of Mr. Assad’s rule, Russian analysts say that the Kremlin will need to adjust to the shifting balance of power in the Middle East. That includes absorbing the likely loss of Russia’s two military bases in Syria, and accepting what analysts call the crushing defeat of Kremlin ally Iran.
Why We Wrote This
Russia was key to keeping Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in power over the last decade. Now he’s gone. But dealing with setback in the Middle East has become a familiar task for the Kremlin.
The psychological blow to Russia is also serious, they warn. The Kremlin’s 2015 military intervention in Syria was Moscow’s first such post-Soviet operation outside its own region. Its perceived success drove a lot of Russia’s subsequent diplomatic efforts in the Mideast, as well as its recent inroads into Africa.
Igor Korotchenko, editor of National Defense, a Moscow-based security journal, says he’s still cautiously optimistic that Russian global influence can survive the loss of Syria, and perhaps the Kremlin can even forge a practical relationship with any new Syrian regime that emerges.
“Let’s wait and see how things play out,” he says. “Russia is still a player in the region, maintaining good relations with countries like the UAE, Egypt, and Qatar. We never put our stakes on one person, and we have sufficient resources to pursue our goals” without a foothold in Syria.
Doling out blame for Syria
For now, the victorious Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces have not touched the Russian Embassy or military installations – Iran’s Embassy in Damascus was trashed on the first day – even though Mr. Assad and his family have been granted asylum in Russia.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday that Moscow was in contact with the new Syrian authorities in an effort to safeguard Russian assets. “We need to base our actions on the realities that exist at this moment on the ground,” he said.
Russia reached out to the Taliban after the United States’ failure in Afghanistan, canceling its “terrorist” designation and discussing a broader normalization of relations; experts say Moscow may wish to make a similar outreach to HTS. But it will be much harder given Russia’s staunch backing of Mr. Assad and its armed efforts to suppress the Syrian opposition over the past decade.
Whatever may happen, the blame game is already in full swing in the Russian media.
Some are pointing at Turkey, which allegedly sidestepped the Astana peace process and went behind Russia’s back to sponsor the HTS rebel offensive that overran Damascus last weekend. Others say Israel’s successful war against major backers like Iran and Hezbollah made Mr. Assad’s fall inevitable, even though Moscow kept providing air support to the bitter end.
Some accuse Mr. Assad himself of self-isolating and refusing all attempts to find a broader social compromise.
“Assad didn’t take Russian advice,” says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. “He was told many times that he needed to initiate some real political reforms, include members of the opposition in government, reconcile with Turkey, and curb the excesses of his security forces. He didn’t listen.
“So, Assad was already distanced from Russia. At the end, he was taking advice from Iran and his own family, not from us,” he says.
“A bad setback, but we can get past this”
Despite the Putin-era aura of success, this is far from the first time Moscow has faced a debacle in its Middle East relations.
Soviet-sponsored Syria lost two wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973, necessitating replacement of its military arsenal. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat canceled a treaty of friendship with the USSR in 1971, and kicked all Soviet advisers out of the country. Moscow’s disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s poisoned its relations with the Muslim world, and even contributed to the collapse of the Soviet state.
“We’ve got a long history of dealing with these countries, and we’re quite accustomed to seeing them defeated militarily,” says Mr. Markov. “So, the mood in Moscow [over the loss of Syria] is calm enough. It’s a bad setback, but we can get past this.”
Unlike the former Soviet Union, which based its foreign policy on ideological calculations, Vladimir Putin’s Russia tends to take a pragmatic and transactional approach, seeking advantage where it can, says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal.
“The Middle East is a region where you can’t expect any lasting success,” he says. “The big loser in this turn of events is Iran, and the winners are Israel and Turkey.”
As for Russian relations with Ankara, he says, “Of course Moscow is angry, because the Turks knew about the HTS offensive and didn’t say a word to us about it. But that’s how Russian-Turkish relations work in general: A very low level of trust, but we try to find common ground and work together where we can.”
Moscow’s formerly good relations with Israel will grow even worse with the implosion of Russian military power in Syria. “Israel is becoming much stronger as a regional power,” says Mr. Markov. “Russia needs to think about how to deal with Israel in these new conditions, where it is a clear winner.”
A shift in world affairs?
Mr. Lukyanov argues that the fall of Mr. Assad illustrates a completely new trend in world affairs, in which regional players take the lead and the influence of their great-power sponsors diminishes. The main actors in the Syrian drama are relatively independent ones, including Israel, Turkey, Iran, and even HTS. The U.S. and Russia are still on the stage, but are not driving events and, Mr. Lukyanov says, are increasingly irrelevant.
“It’s a seismic shift, in which outside powers are steadily losing influence and local actors are taking the lead,” he says. “Russian capacities are shrinking, but so are American ones. In future, regional powers will be the most important players, formulating their priorities in a regional way.”
Russia already made the choice to put its own local interests first, declining to divert any resources from its war in Ukraine to help Mr. Assad.
“Moscow needs to think about the implications of this,” Mr. Lukyanov says. “Maybe the race for global influence is obsolete, and Russia needs to reformulate its ambitions in terms of being an effective regional power.”
