The news this week that Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun is under investigation for corruption served as a clear indication that Xi Jinping is restructuring his military high command. Then, just a day later, came an announcement that Admiral Miao Hua, a fellow member of the Chinese Central Military Commission and head of the political work department in the People’s Liberation Army, had also been accused of “serious violations of discipline”. When one adds these cases to the purge which took place last year of key parts of the country’s army, culminating in Dong’s predecessor Li Shangfu being ousted last October, the process appears ever more cyclical.
Why the need for this constant reshuffling of the upper ranks? The Red Army, since its foundation in 1927, has always been the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party: its loyalty lies there, rather than with the state. Historically, it provided the key power base for both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, a trump card to be produced whenever their power was challenged.
Xi worked in the military at the beginning of his career, before moving on to the civilian arm of government, and so carries direct knowledge of how China’s army works. But a new factor is the significant increase in the country’s military expenditure. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 2024 China’s overall budget for defence will reach a record $233 billion. While still some way behind the US, in real terms the resources available to Beijing’s soldiers and generals are massive.
