In stark contrast to the discourse in the United States, there have been very few open conversations between Europe and Taiwan regarding defense spending or arms acquisitions. While the United States is actively exerting pressure on Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY, 立法院) to pass a national defense budget that will incorporate a USD 11.1 billion arms package, European countries have retained a cautious, low-profile stance on the matter. This is likely due to the diplomatic and economic pressure that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has historically exerted on Europe’s middle powers. For example, in the 1980s, the PRC downgraded diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in response to the latter’s decision to sell two submarines to Taiwan. Reluctant to disrupt relations with such a large trading partner, the Dutch government solemnly agreed that it would refrain from further arms sales to Taiwan in the future. In 1991 and 1992, France sold six naval frigates and 60 Mirage jets to Taiwan. In retaliation, Beijing closed the French Consulate-General in Guangzhou and publicly urged France to withdraw from the sale. France has not sold Taipei any other major weapons systems since. As a result of Beijing’s coercion, three decades have passed since Europe supplied Taipei with any big-ticket defense items.
Despite this historical track record, there are growing indications that the status quo is changing through the exchange of dual-use technology—equipment or software that can be used in either commercial or military applications. In September 2025, the International Defense Industry Exhibition (MSPO) was hosted in Kielce, Poland. Notably, a Taiwanese industry delegation signed memoranda of understanding with Polish and Ukrainian partners to cooperate on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, pairing Taiwan’s components with Polish expertise and Ukraine’s wartime research and development (R&D). Later in the same month, Taiwan hosted its largest defense exhibition, the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE), which attracted companies from the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Germany, and France. This recent growth in engagement between Europe and Taiwan can largely be attributed to the conflict in Ukraine. The war on Europe’s doorstep has been a major driver of increased R&D focused on defense technology. Modern warfare techniques premiered in Ukraine are now a vital form of education to countries in the Indo-Pacific theatre, and increasing Russian encroachment on land and sea in Europe has encouraged an alignment of defense concerns between democratic powers.
Viewed solely in terms of arms sales, one could be forgiven for thinking that the United States is the only country actively involved in Taiwan’s defense industry development. In fact, emerging technological collaboration between Taiwan and European democracies has created pipelines for the exchange of vital dual-use technology.
Image: Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association President Tony Hsu (front left) and the founder of the Taiwan-Poland Chamber of Commerce, Bartlomiej Dobosz (front right), sign a memorandum of understanding at the International Defense Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Poland (Sept. 3, 2025). (Image source: ROC Overseas Community Affairs Council)
Submarine Technology
Quiet contributions to Taiwan’s submarine industry from Germany and the United Kingdom have assisted in the development of Taiwan’s first homegrown sub, the Hai Kun-class submarine (海鯤級潛艦). In March 2023, the British government approved export licenses to companies engaging in submarine-related components and technology to Taiwan, totaling a record value of 167 million pounds (USD 201.29 million). Despite a reputation for caution in defense technology transfers, Berlin followed suit in August last year, approving export licenses to Taiwan for submarine main engines and periscopes. In 2024, Germany had already sold Taiwan a sonar system for a light frigate. In light of this assistance from Europe, Taiwan successfully completed a maiden underwater sea trial for its indigenous Hai Kun submarine this year. The low-profile assistance given by the UK and Germany—along with the support of other countries such as the United States and Japan—is helping Taiwan reach its goal of deploying two domestically-developed submarines by 2027, with a target of a full fleet of eight submarines by 2038.
UAV Collaboration
As uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) become an increasingly popular tool for gray zone warfare, Europe and Taiwan have been left grappling with persistent UAV encroachments. Both China and Russia have developed reputations for testing defense capabilities via so-called “salami slicing” (making small incremental advances that are each too minor to warrant a retaliation, but over time may exhaust opposition forces). Germany, France, Denmark, Belgium and Italy have all experienced drone incursions targeting critical infrastructure and military bases. This is in addition to Russia’s continued gray zone harassment of Eastern European nations along its border.
In a similar fashion, Taiwan has been a victim of drone incursions from the PRC in recent years. Such is the threat posed by PRC incursions that Taiwan’s legislature is discussing the allocation of one-third of President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) proposed NTD 1.25 trillion (USD 40 billion) special defense budget to the development of the so-called “T-Dome,” a multi-layered air defense network that would act to intercept approaching UAVs, missiles, and aircraft. With this in mind, further concerns have been raised regarding China’s present control of around 80 percent of the global drone market—with dominance over an even higher proportion of critical UAV-related components. Combined with the PRC’s covert support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine through the supply of battlefield-relevant technology, the shared threat of UAV encroachment renders Europe-Taiwan collaboration all the more prudent.
The rapid expansion of Poland’s demand for Taiwanese drones has laid the path for an emergent defense supply chain between Taiwan and Europe. From January to August 2025, Poland absorbed almost 60 percent of Taiwan’s drone exports, equating to approximately USD 32 million in sales. Many observers suggest that the recent Polish appetite for UAVs is a consequence of a covert supply chain into Ukraine’s war effort against the Russian invasion.
Meanwhile, the European Union as a whole has outlined an objective of UAV collaboration with Taiwan. On January 22, 2026, the European Parliament passed a resolution titled “Drones and new systems of warfare–the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges.” The text of the resolution specifically outlined Taiwan as a target for cooperation in “drone technology and relevant industries.” In February of this year, five European nations—France, Poland, Germany, the UK and Italy—launched a joint program to utilize Ukrainian expertise in the production of low-cost drones, air defense systems, and autonomous drones. Although this program is not directly linked to Taiwan, it demonstrates Europe’s commitment to advancing its UAV capabilities. When considered in conjunction with the January 22 resolution, the program indicates that European countries will look to Taiwan as a potential strategic partner for future sustainable drone and counter-drone capabilities.
Connectivity Resilience
In recent years, awareness has grown regarding the strategic importance of undersea cables—which carry internet and other forms of electronic communications between nations. According to a Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) study, “Commercial undersea cable communications carry over 97 percent of all intercontinental electronic communications.” In times of conflict, disruptions to the undersea cable systems could complicate a state’s communications with allies and delay the transfer of crucial logistical information. Due to the vulnerability of these systems, the PRC and Russia are increasingly targeting undersea cables for acts of gray zone sabotage. In recent years, Taiwan has suffered undersea cable damage from PRC-origin vessels. This was most recently documented in February 2025, when the Hong Tai 58 (宏泰58號)—a PRC-owned ship flying a Togolese flag—was detained by Taiwan’s coast guard after severing undersea cables close to Penghu in the Taiwan Strait. Europe has experienced similar threats. On November 13, 2024, the Chinese shipping vessel Yipung 3 (伊鹏 3) left a Russian port on the Baltic Sea, dropped its anchor and dragged it along the sea floor for 100 miles—cutting two undersea cables delivering internet to both Finland and Sweden in the process. Such gray zone tactics have spurred Taiwanese and European collaboration in the improvement of connectivity resilience.
In order to diversify its internet connectivity sources away from undersea cables, Taiwan has looked to Europe for its strategy of launching multi-orbit satellites. By deploying telecommunications satellite technologies in low- and medium-Earth orbit, Taiwan aims to mitigate against potential attacks on its undersea telecommunications infrastructure, and to preserve its internal military networks. In 2023, the Executive Yuan (行政院) passed a four-year digital resilience plan with a projected budget of NTD 1.34 billion (USD 41.86 million). The plan emphasizes developing Taiwan’s space infrastructure. Two of Europe’s largest satellite providers, Eutelsat OneWeb (a French-British company) and SES (based in Luxembourg), are partnering with Taiwan’s state-run telecommunications company Chunghwa Telecom (中華電信) on two different satellite technology projects. According to Alex Chien (簡志誠), executive vice president of Chunghwa Telecom, “Taiwan is an island and relies heavily on submarine cables for external connectivity, with satellites serving as a secondary option. Therefore, satellite services are essential communication tools for the Taiwanese government and businesses”.
While progress has been slowed by a long regulatory approval process, Chunghwa was granted Taiwan’s first commercial license in June 2025 to employ Eutelsat OneWeb’s existing LEO satellite services. SES has been working on a similar timeline. On January 30 of this year, the Luxembourg-based company and Chunghwa Telecom signed a memorandum of understanding to build an O3b mPower gateway in Taiwan (a physical communication hub on the ground instead of in space) that will help to route data directly to satellites rather than through undersea cables. European support for Taiwan’s burgeoning satellite communication network will allow Taipei to offset its undersea cable vulnerabilities in times of crisis or war.
Conclusion
Even though Europe has yet to sell Taiwan any military end products, European nations continue to serve as important partners for Taiwan’s defense industries through the provision of dual-use input technologies. The UK has maintained an advanced submarine development industry since the 1960s, and is sharing this expertise with Taiwan’s program. Additionally, the war in Ukraine has redefined the bounds of modern warfare through the mass scaling of UAVs. Taiwanese drone exports routed through Poland to Ukraine have offered Taiwanese manufacturers an unprecedented opportunity to test their technology on the battlefield. Finally, the European firms Eutelsat OneWeb and SES have been critical to Taiwan’s efforts to obtain satellites that can reduce the island’s reliance on undersea telecommunications networks in crisis or war scenarios.
The main point: Europe has already proved itself an important defense partner to Taiwan, offering dual-use technologies to bolster Taiwan’s defense industry and critical infrastructure. The countries of Europe are quietly sharing their comparative advantages in submarine technology, UAVs, and satellites to benefit Taiwan’s defense. In doing so, Europe is helping to shore up security in the Taiwan Strait.
